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Wer, von inneren Kra¨ften angeregt, sich ein solches Werk vorsetzen will, der ru¨ste sich zu
dem frommen Unternehmen mit Kra¨ften wie zu einer weiten Pilgerfahrt aus. Er opfere Zeit
und scheue keine Anstrengung, er fu¨rchte keine zeitliche Gewalt und Gro¨ße, er erhebe sich
u¨ber eigene Eitelkeit und falsche Scham, um nach dem Ausdruck des franzo¨sischen Kodex
die Wahrheit zu sagen, nichts als die Wahrheit, die ganze Wahrheit.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
The qualification for the UEFA European Championship 2020 is strongly connected
to the inaugural season 2018-19 of the UEFA Nations League. The latter competition
divides the 55 UEFA national teams into four leagues, and the qualifying play-offs
guarantee at least one place in the final tournament for the best four teams of each
league. Consequently, we found that being a top team in the lowest-ranked League
D can substantially increase the probability of qualification compared to being a
bottom team in League C because the probability of direct qualification is negligible
for the teams competing for these places. It may undermine credibility: the current
rules may punish stronger performance in recent matches, and create incentives for
strategic manipulation. UEFA is encouraged to reform the format of qualifications in
order to minimise the unfair advantage enjoyed by the top teams of UEFA Nations
League D.2
Keywords: OR in sports; tournament design; incentive compatibility; football;
simulation
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1 “Whoever, stirred by ambition, undertakes such a task, let him prepare himself for his pious
undertaking as for a long pilgrimage; let him give up his time, spare no sacrifice, fear no temporal rank or
power, and rise above all feelings of personal vanity, of false shame, in order, according to the French
code, to speak the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth.” (Source: Carl von Clausewitz:
On War, Book 2, Chapter 6 – On Examples. Translated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N.
Tru¨bner, 1873. http://clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
2 The paper is dedicated to the reminiscence of a conversation with Henrietta Ne´meth.
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1 Introduction
The governing bodies of major sports often face difficulties when they try to enhance
competitive balance in an ill-designed way as giving an advantage to underdogs may make
losing a profitable strategy for certain teams. Such tournaments can be called unfair
because sports rules should give appropriate incentives to perform (Preston and Szymanski,
2003; Szymanski, 2003).
The danger of misalignment is especially significant after recent rule changes as
illustrated by a number of historical cases (Kendall and Lenten, 2017). In this paper, we
deal with an unfair competition design from (association) football, probably the most
popular sports in the world. In particular, it will be demonstrated that the qualification
for the UEFA European Championship 2020 contains a powerful incentive for strategic
manipulation, which can be exploited by some teams in the future unless the issue is
adequately solved.
The problem is caused by a policy of the Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA), supposedly introduced to increase the diversity of the UEFA European Champi-
onship 2020. Its qualifying process starts with the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League, the
inaugural season of this tournament. It divides the 55 national teams into four leagues
such that the best 12 teams are in League A, the next 12 in League B, the next 15 in
League C, and the last 16 in League D. However, simulations show that a given team
is considerably better off at the top of League D than at the bottom of League C with
respect to the probability of qualification since at least one group winner from each league
is guaranteed to compete in the UEFA European Championship 2020.
Our paper is probably the first detailed documentation of this unfairness. Nevertheless,
the format has been criticised for allowing weaker teams to qualify through the Nations
League in the media (Dunbar, 2017), and a webpage – written by the Romanian computer
programmer Eduard Ranghiuc – provides some preliminary calculations that losing could
improve the chances of participating in the final tournament (Ranghiuc, 2017).
In terms of organisation, Section 2 gives a concise review of related literature. The
qualification for the UEFA European Championship 2020 is outlined in Section 3, while
Section 4 describes our simulation technique. Section 5 presents quantitative results with
a sensitivity analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Examples of tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to
gain some other advantage, occur in several sports (Kendall and Lenten, 2017).
In the 2012 London Olympics, eight women players were disqualified from the doubles
badminton competition, charged with “not using one’s best efforts to win a match” and
“conducting oneself in a manner that is clearly abusive or detrimental to the sport” (Kendall
and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.3.1). The reason was that they wanted to be second rather
than first in their round-robin groups in order to get (perceived) easier draws in the
knockout stage. This event has inspired at least two papers discussing mathematical
models of strategic manipulation (Pauly, 2014; Vong, 2017).
It is a well-known fact that sports using player drafts with the traditional set-up of
reverse order sometimes make losing a profitable strategy because teams might decrease
efforts to win after they have no more chance to progress (Taylor and Trogdon, 2002;
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Balsdon et al., 2007; Lenten, 2016; Lenten et al., 2018). It is even found that there is a
concrete strategy behind losing (Fornwagner, 2018).
Similar opportunities for manipulation can emerge in football, too: Lasek et al. (2016)
present some strategies to improve a team’s position in the official FIFA ranking.
The situation can be even worse when a team is strictly better off by losing, not only
in expected terms. According to Dagaev and Sonin (2018), tournament systems consisting
of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes generally
do not satisfy strategy-proofness. Their result reveals the incentive incompatibility of
the UEFA Europa League qualification before the 2015-16 season (Dagaev and Sonin,
2018), and the violation of strategy-proofness by the UEFA Champions League in three
seasons (Csato´, 2019f). As a consequence, SC Heerenveen was ex ante interested in losing
compared to playing a draw on its last match in the 2011-12 Eredivisie, the highest echelon
of professional football in the Netherlands (Csato´, 2019g).
The European qualifiers to recent FIFA World Cups are also shown to create similar
perverse incentives (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013; Csato´, 2017a), although there exist straight-
forward strategy-proof mechanisms which are able to solve the issue (Csato´, 2018a). UEFA
just avoided a serious scandal because of this problem (Csato´, 2018c), furthermore, it is
even possible that both teams want to avoid winning a match (Csato´, 2018b).
Tournaments with multiple group stages, in which some (but not all) match results
from the preliminary round are carried over to the main round, are also found to suffer
from incentive incompatibility (Csato´, 2019d).
Naturally, unfairness is a more general issue than incentive incompatibility. Guyon
(2015) highlights obvious mistakes of the FIFA World Cup draw, resulting from the way
of enforcing the geographical constraints. Laliena and Lo´pez (2019) propose two fair draw
systems that outperform the solution of Guyon (2015). Dura´n et al. (2017) suggest a
fairer schedule for the South American qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, which
was unanimously approved by the South American Football Confederation. Guyon (2018)
identifies a number of flaws in the design of the knockout bracket of the UEFA European
Championship 2016 and provides two fairer procedures. Krumer (2019) finds that match
kick-off time has an effect on attendance and performance in the group stage of the UEFA
Europa League. Guyon (2019) quantifies the risk of collusion in groups of three teams
when the best two advance to the next round in order to show that the planned format of
the FIFA World Cup 2026 is vulnerable to match fixing.
A plausible interpretation of fairness can be the equal treatment of equals. Sequential
round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players are proved to violate
this requirement both theoretically (Krumer et al., 2017a,b; Sahm, 2019) and empirically
(Krumer and Lechner, 2017). Csato´ (2013) and Csato´ (2017b) present that the ranking in
Swiss-system tournaments suffers from not taking the strength of schedule into considera-
tion, hence it gives an advantage to players showing an improving performance during the
competition. Because penalty shootouts in football unjustly favour the team kicking the
first penalty (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Vandebroek
et al., 2018), and there is an intention to improve their fairness (IFAB, 2018), alternative
mechanisms have been proposed to reduce this inequality (Palacios-Huerta, 2012; Anbarcı
et al., 2015; Echenique, 2017; Anbarcı et al., 2018; Brams and Ismail, 2018; Cohen-Zada
et al., 2018; Csato´, 2019a).
For the purpose of demonstrating and quantifying the unfairness of the UEFA European
Championship 2020 qualifying, we will use simulations, which is a standard procedure in
the comparison and evaluation of various tournament designs (Scarf et al., 2009; Scarf
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and Yusof, 2011; Goossens et al., 2012; Boczon´ and Wilson, 2018; Lasek and Gagolewski,
2018; Csato´, 2019e; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019). In addition, it is known from the
men’s handball Champions League that a well-devised competition format can increase
competitive balance in round-robin groups – one aim of launching the UEFA Nations
League – without sacrificing fairness (Csato´, 2019b).
3 Qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020
The 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, or shortly UEFA Euro 2020, is the
16th international men’s football championship of Europe. For the first time, it will be
spread over 12 cities in 12 countries across the continent, so no national team gets an
automatic qualifying berth. While, similarly to the UEFA Euro 2016, 24 teams participate
in the final tournament, the qualification competition is also fundamentally different from
the previous ones – for which Csato´ (2018a) provides a concise overview – as it is strongly
connected to the inaugural season 2018-19 of the UEFA Nations League.
The whole process of qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020 is described in two official
documents (UEFA, 2018a,b). It starts with the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League. In the
first step, the 55 UEFA national teams are divided into four divisions called leagues. In
particular, the teams are ordered according to their UEFA national team coefficients at the
end of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers without the play-offs, and the 12 highest-ranked
teams form League A, the next 12 form League B, the next 15 form League C, and the
remaining 16 form League D. The leagues are divided into four groups of three (Leagues
A and B), four groups of four (League D), and three groups of four plus one group of
three teams (League C). The groups are organised as a home-away (double) round-robin
tournament, therefore each team plays four or six matches.
After ranking the teams in each group, four league rankings are established, and
an overall UEFA Nations League ranking is derived: the 12 teams of League A occupy
positions 1st to 12th according to the ranking in League A, the 12 teams of League B
occupy positions 13th to 24th according to the ranking in League B, the 15 teams of
League C occupy positions 25th to 39th according to the ranking in League C, and the 16
teams of League D occupy positions 40th to 55th according to the ranking in League D.
This is followed by the next stage, called the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying. The 55
teams are divided into five groups of five (A-E) and five groups of six teams (F-J) such
that the teams are seeded according to the overall UEFA Nations League ranking: teams
1-4 (from League A) are placed into the UNL Pot, teams 5-10 (from League A) are placed
into Pot 1, teams 11-20 (from Leagues A and B) are placed into Pot 2, teams 21-30 (from
Leagues B and C) are placed into Pot 3, teams 31-40 (from Leagues C and D) are placed
into Pot 4, teams 41-50 (from League D) are placed into Pot 5, and teams 51-55 (from
League D) are placed into Pot 6. Then Groups A-D get one team from the UNL Pot, and
one team from Pots 2-5, Group E gets one team from Pots 1-5, while Groups F-J get one
team from Pots 1-6. To summarise, the draw applies a standard procedure but the best
four teams are guaranteed to be in the smaller groups. There are also specific restrictions
due to host nations, prohibited team clashes (because of political reasons), winter venue,
and excessive travel (UEFA, 2018c). The groups are organised in a home-away (double)
round-robin scheme with the first two teams advancing to the UEFA Euro 2020.
After the qualifying group stage, the four remaining berths are filled by the play-offs.
16 teams, that did not qualified for the UEFA Euro 2020 directly, are selected on the basis
of the overall UEFA Nations League ranking and are divided into four paths containing
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four teams each according to a complicated procedure which guarantees that at least
one team from each league qualifies for the final tournament: the UEFA Nations League
group winners participate in a play-off path of their league without facing any team
from a higher-ranked league (unless they are directly qualified). However, the rules are
contradictory and may lead to an unfair formulation of play-off paths (Csato´, 2019c).
4 Implementation
We attempt to quantify the probability of qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020 for
each UEFA members by a simulational methodology. This aim immediately provides the
tournament metric to be analysed.
Since our focus is on the process of qualification and not on the accurate modelling of
match outcome, the probability with which a given team defeats its opponent is fixed a
priori. In addition, draws in the matches are prohibited, and every tie-breaking is resolved
randomly.
Our computer code closely follows the relevant UEFA regulations (UEFA, 2018a,b)
with some minor differences:
∙ The first four places (1st to 4th) of the overall UEFA Nations League ranking
are determined as in the other three leagues, that is, on the basis of the UEFA
Nations League group results, and not through the UEFA Nations League Finals.
However, the draw of the groups in the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying shows that
this does not affect the outcome of a simulation run.
∙ The specific restrictions in the draw of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying (UEFA,
2018c) are ignored.
∙ The contradiction in the rules of the play-offs is avoided by the procedure suggested
in Csato´ (2019c, Section 4.1).
The last two modifications have only a marginal effect on the results.
Each simulation with fixed winning probabilities has been run one million times.
5 Results
The fixed winning probabilities are derived from the World Football Elo Ratings, published
regularly on the website eloratings.net. While there exists no single nor any official Elo
ranking for football teams, Elo rankings seem to have the highest prediction power (Lasek
et al., 2013). The overhauled formula for the FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking, used from
June 2018, also applies the Elo method of calculation (FIFA, 2018). Furthermore, Elo
rating directly gives win expectancy 𝑊𝑒 according to the following formula:
𝑊𝑒 =
1
1 + 10−𝑑/𝑠 , (1)
where 𝑑 is the difference between the Elo ratings of the two teams that play the match,
and 𝑠 = 400 is a scaling parameter.
In particular, we have used Elo ratings as of 6 December 2017 since the seeding pots of
the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League were announced on 7 December 2017. This is considered
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to be an appropriate measure of teams’ strength. They are reported in Table 1, together
with the ranking from the UEFA national team coefficients used for the seeding of the
2018-19 UEFA Nations League.
Figure 1: The probability of qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020
800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500 1,600 1,700 1,800 1,900 2,000 2,100 2,200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Elo rating
League A League B League C League D
Figure 1 plots the probability of qualification for each team as a function of its Elo
rating. It can be seen that a team allocated into a lower-ranked league (League B instead
of League A, or League C instead of League B) has usually a smaller chance to qualify for
the UEFA Euro 2020 ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, this difference is completely reversed in the comparison of Leagues
C and D. Figure 2 reveals that being in a lower-ranked league has two separate effects:
∙ the probability of direct qualification decreases because being in a weaker league
decreases (eliminates) the probability of obtaining a place in a stronger Pot, so
the team should play against stronger teams on average in the groups of the
UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament (see Figure 2.a); but
∙ the probability of qualification through the play-offs increases because the team
can win its Nations League group easier, which guarantees a place in the play-off
path of its own league (see Figure 2.b).
When the probability of direct qualification is low, that is, in the comparison of the bottom
of League C and the top of League D for the given distribution of teams’ strength, the
second effect dominates the first, hence having a worse rank at the beginning of the 2018-19
UEFA Nations League raises the overall probability of qualification for the UEFA Euro
2020.
In order to further illustrate this fact, Figure 3 presents the actual and hypothetical
probabilities of qualification for three countries:
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Figure 2: The decomposed probability of qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020
(a) Probability of direct qualification
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(b) Probability of qualification through the play-offs
800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500 1,600 1,700 1,800 1,900 2,000 2,100 2,200
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∙ the Netherlands as the worst team in League A (12th) and the best team in
League B (13th);
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Figure 3: The probability of qualification for teams at the boundary of two leagues
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∙ Turkey as the worst team in League B (24th) and the best team in League C
(25th);
∙ Lithuania as the worst team in League C (39th) and the best team in League D
(40th).
By allocation into a lower-ranked league, the probability of qualification has decreased by
about 2.2% for the Netherlands, and it has decreased by about 10% for Turkey, but it has
increased more than seven-fold for Lithuania. While the probability of direct qualification
has become lower and the probability of qualification through play-offs has become higher
in each case, the latter effect dominates the former in the comparison of Leagues C and D,
which seems to be unfair and may create an opportunity for strategic manipulation. We
will return to this issue in the final section of the paper.
The robustness of the negative result derived for Lithuania can be checked by modifying
the scaling parameter 𝑠 in expression (1). Its original value of 400 can be judged excessive:
for example, it implies that the best team, Germany defeats the 10th (Croatia) with a
probability of 81.1%, and wins against the 30th (Bulgaria) with a probability of 93.4%.
In addition, the comparison has been implemented between the worst place of League C
(39th) and the fifth place of League D (44th) as obtaining the 40th position by a strategic
behaviour cannot be guaranteed. Note that there is no difference in the probability of
qualification between the 37th-39th places and the 40th-43rd places because of the seeding
procedure.
Figure 4: The probability of qualification for Lithuania
39th 44th
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39th 44th
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Direct qualification Qualification through play-offs
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Thus, three more competitive distributions of teams’ strength have been considered
and drawn in Figure 4. Although the advantage of the 44th over the 39th place decreases
when inequality is reduced, it remains substantial, so any team has a strong incentive to
avoid being 37th, 38th, and 39th in the UEFA ranking underlying the formation of the
UEFA Nations League.
6 Discussion
Our paper has been revealed a flaw of the qualification process for the UEFA European
Championship 2020: it is unfair in the sense that obtaining a worst position in the
ranking of the national teams used for the seeding of 2018-19 UEFA Nations League can
considerably increase the probability of participation in the final tournament. This feature
endangers the sport’s credibility because certain teams may aim to manipulate the ranking.
The 55 UEFA members have been divided into the four leagues according to their
UEFA national team coefficients after the conclusion of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers
without the play-offs. They are calculated from a weighted average:
∙ 20% of the average ranking points collected in the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualifi-
cation and final;
∙ 40% of the average ranking points collected in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualification
and final;
∙ 40% of the average ranking points collected in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifi-
cation.
The allocation of match points is explained in UEFA (2009).
The last nine matches (three matches each in the UEFA groups A, B, and H) that
influence this ranking were played at the end of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers on 10
October 2017. In particular, Belgium vs Cyprus was 4-0, resulting in 19491.08 points for
Cyprus, which resulted in the 37th position. The 40th was Azerbaijan with 17760.82 points.
However, Cyprus would be better off on the 40th place with respect to the probability of
qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020. A conceded goal in any match means −500 points,
which should be divided by 10 (the number of matches in the 2018 FIFA World Cup
qualification), and has a weight of 0.4 in the UEFA national team coefficient considered.
Consequently, Cyprus would be only the 40th by kicking 1740/20 = 87 own goals against
Belgium because the point difference between Azerbaijan and Cyprus was 1730.82.
While an application of this strategy can be easily identified and probably sanctioned by
the UEFA, if a team is willing to sacrifice a whole FIFA World Cup qualification – where the
probability of its success is marginal anyway –, then it can achieve the 40th-43th positions in
a relatively simple way. For instance, Lithuania obtained six points in the 2018 FIFA World
Cup qualification. But if it would have played a draw of 2-2 against Malta on 11 October
2016 instead of winning by 2-0, then it would have 18100.74− 1640.08+ 800.08 = 17260.74
points, guaranteeing the 40th position. In other words, Lithuania was severely punished
for its win against Malta by the controversial format of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying.
In our view, the presented simulation means a convincing example of how certain teams
might strategically manipulate the UEFA Nations League if it remains linked with the
qualification for certain tournaments in an inappropriate way such as in the UEFA Euro
2020 qualifying. Fortunately, it is not yet decided how the FIFA World Cup 2022 and
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UEFA Euro 2024 qualifying will be organised (the latter cannot directly follow UEFA
Euro 2020 qualifying because Germany will automatically qualify as the host). UEFA
is strongly encouraged to take our results into consideration in setting the rules for the
future.
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